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I.

INTRODUCTION

Many legal positivists no longer deny that there is a necessary
1
connection between law and morality. This concession, however,
†
LL.M., James Kent Scholar, Columbia University School of Law; M.A.
Philosophy, Graduate Center of the City University of New York; J.D., University of
Connecticut School of Law. The author directs the appellate litigation unit at
Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., New York, New York. I thank Michael Gentithes, David
Lyons, Thomas H. Morawetz, Gerald J. Postema, and Brian Sheppard for having
generously taken the time to read and comment upon earlier versions of this
paper. I also thank Robert Alexy, John Finnis, Edward A. Purcell, Jr., and John R.
Searle for their encouragement, as well as Professors Gregory T. Papanikos and
David A. Frenkel and other participants in the July 14, 2015 session of the Athens
Institute for Education and Research’s 12th Annual International Conference on
Law.
1. See Joseph Raz, Incorporation By Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2004), reprinted
in JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW
AND PRACTICAL REASON 182, 189 (Oxford U. Press 2009) [hereinafter RAZ,
BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION] (acknowledging that the legal
normative point of view derives what validity it has from the moral one); see also

225
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leaves positivism’s other theses intact. Positivism’s central thesis is
that, whether always the case, typically the case, or the case in at
least one legal system, moral justification does not supply the
2
criteria by which a rule or principle counts as legal. Instead, a
society will have an overriding social practice or convergence of
official behavior that, as a matter of social fact rather than moral
3
reasoning, determines legality. We can then decide what the law is
without committing ourselves to a view about which decision would
4
be morally right.
If legality is determined by social convention, this being mainly
a uniform judicial practice, the pull is to conclude that there is
widespread agreement throughout the legal system about the
5
ground of law and the criteria of legal validity. As a result,
positivism has had a stake in presenting a picture of law in which
theoretical disagreement is minimal.
If theoretical disagreement in law appears to occur somewhat
frequently, however, this cuts in favor of a non-positivist conception
that connects legal practice to moral assessments, which are
typically controversial and subject to widespread disagreement. For
instance, the legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin viewed theoretical
Joseph Raz, About Morality and the Nature of Law, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 14 (2003),
reprinted in RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION 166, 180 (stating that law
“is a structure of authority . . . in the business of telling people what they must do”
and thereby “claims to have legitimate moral authority over its subjects”); SCOTT J.
SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 187 (2011) (“[T]he legal point of view always purports to
represent the moral point of view, even when it fails to do so.”); cf. Philip Soper,
Searching for Positivism, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1739, 1741 (1996) (reviewing WILFRID J.
WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994)) (discussing the issue of “whether
and why positivism can or cannot accept moral principles as part of the law”).
2. Wilfrid J. Waluchow, The Many Faces of Legal Positivism, 48 U. TORONTO
L.J. 387, 395 (1998) (noting that depending on the variant of legal positivism one
espouses the “internally sanctioned criteria for what counts as a valid legal
standard” will never, or may sometimes, “make reference to morality”).
3. HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 258 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2d
ed. 1994) (1961).
4. See Jeremy Waldron, Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPERS—PAPER 417 (2013),
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/417?utm_source=lsr.nellco.org%2Fnyu_plltwp%
2F417&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages; cf. MATTHEW H.
KRAMER, IN DEFENSE OF LEGAL POSITIVISM: LAW WITHOUT TRIMMINGS 44, 59–60
(1999) (arguing that procedural principles that some deem to provide law with an
inner morality are, in reality, equally consistent with an evil legal system).
5. Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215,
1226–27 (2009); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 513–14 (1988).
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disagreement in law as endemic, and this view supported his theory
6
of law as rooted in moral content. Judges both interpret the legal
record to determine which principle best fits the conflict and seek
out the right answer based on their best construction of those
principles. Because the principles that judges use to interpret the
legal record are derived from the community’s political morality,
disagreements over how to achieve the “right answer” will be
7
especially contentious.
One reason that there are competing claims about the extent
to which “theoretical disagreement” exists in law is that the term
can be defined narrowly or broadly. The narrow view tends to focus
on the interpretive method in constitutional or statutory disputes.
For example, should a constitutional provision be interpreted
based on the perceived original intent of its framers, its original
meaning for citizens at the time, or as a shifting blueprint for the
8
exercise of state power alive to contemporary values? Should
evaluation of an enactment be limited to its text, or account for the
intent of the legislators? These controversies make up the tiniest
fraction of law’s practice, however vigorously they are disputed
when they do arise.
This tapered construction of “theoretical disagreement” begs
the question in positivism’s favor. Dworkin did not see things so
narrowly. He saw controversy as inhering in the argumentative
6. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 7–8 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S
EMPIRE]; see generally Scott Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the
Perplexed, in RONALD DWORKIN, CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY IN FOCUS 22, 35 (Arthur
Ripstein ed., 2007) (explaining that Dworkin’s central retort to legal positivism is
that “legal positivists are unable to account for a certain type of disagreements that
legal participants frequently have”).
7. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 225; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 126 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; cf.
A.E. Dick Howard, Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise Lecture Symposium: The Indeterminacy
of Constitutions, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 383, 390–91 (1996) (agreeing with James
Madison that because language is inherently imprecise, its meanings can be settled
only upon “a series of particular discussions and adjudications”) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 37, at 179 (James Madison) (Gary Wills ed., 1982)); Richard K.
Sherwin, Law, Violence and Illiberal Belief, 78 GEO. L.J. 1785, 1822 (1990) (“Faced
with a plurality of possible normative constructions of social reality, the question
arises: How do we regulate conflicting and perhaps incommensurable ways of
thinking and speaking about a given controversy?”).
8. John O. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Our Origins, 19 HARV. J.L.
& PUBLIC POL’Y 251, 261 (1995); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 554–55 (2003).
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9

structure of legal practice. When judges disagree in what Dworkin
called “the theoretical way,” these disagreements are interpretative.
Judges often “disagree, in large measure or in fine detail, about the
soundest interpretation of some pertinent aspect of judicial
10
practice.” To this point, it is difficult to deny that theoretical
controversy is frequent in legal practice. Dworkin’s affinity with
natural law theory derived from his further claim that law’s content
resides in morally justified principles that practitioners should use
to construe the community’s legal practice in the most favorable
11
light.
Some positivists have tried to reconcile the existence of
theoretical disagreements in law with the commitment to a social
fact-based legal theory. For instance, Scott Shapiro suggests a view
of legal controversy according to which interpreters debate the
point of legal practice, which is, for him, an empirical question
about the political attitudes and objectives of those who “designed”
12
the legal system. Disputes about a regime’s “animating ideology”
are disputes about social facts, and the question becomes which
13
methodology best harmonizes with that scheme.
This article similarly seeks to reconcile the existence of
widespread theoretical disagreement in law with a commitment to a
social fact-based legal theory. Those disagreements are not easily
characterized, however, as exercises in how best to defer to the
decisions of “designers” of the legal system’s political objectives and
14
divisions of labor. While courts and litigants do sometimes debate
9. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 13 (discussing the “crucial
argumentative aspect of legal practice”).
10. Id. at 87. But cf. Southard v. Morris, 31 Ohio Dec. 684, 687 (Ct. Com. Pl.
1913) (suggesting that the legal practitioner’s duty is to argue in a way that places
her client’s interests in the best light, including by way of “[i]llustrations,
analogies, inferences from facts proved, and in some instances, from failure to
introduce proof when it appears reasonable”).
11. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 225; see Jules L. Coleman, THE
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST TO LEGAL THEORY 157 (Oxford
U. Press 2001).
12. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 43–47.
13. Id. at 48.
14. See id. at 47; Herbert L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 627 (1958) (stating an intuitively more appealing,
albeit somewhat similar, view when he said that “the inclusion of the new case
under the rule takes its place as a natural elaboration of the rule, as something
implementing a ‘purpose’ which it seems natural to attribute (in some sense) to
the rule itself rather than to any particular person dead or alive.”).
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the original rationales for rules and statutory schemes, this sort of
controversy is not particularly pervasive and does not likely account
15
for a broader occurrence of theoretical disagreement.
By taking advantage of philosophical resources just recently
16
being developed in scholarship about the logic of institutions, this
article provides a more compelling reason for agreeing with
Dworkin that theoretical disagreement in law is widespread and
rooted in law’s argumentative structure, while at the same time
refusing to draw the inference that morality and moral controversy
17
engenders this widespread disagreement.
Law’s institutional nature renders nonmoral theoretical
disagreement widely possible, and frequently actual. As an
institution, law must comport with, and be sustained by,
18
institutional logic. Most importantly for the purposes of this
article, the sort of cooperation requisite to the initiation and
maintenance of institutional reality requires that the institution in
progress abide by two general constraints. The institution must (1)
direct its constitutive and regulative rules at the appropriate social
phenomenon, and (2) define its power relations and commitments
with a sufficient level of exactness so as to render those rules and
19
commitments recognizable as such reasons for action.
In the context of legal systems, these constraints supply a
fertile ground for the sort of disagreement over institutional norms
that may be described as theoretical. An understanding of the logic
of institutional power and authority shows that “theoretical”
disputes in law are, in the first instance, best understood as
controversies over the standards for determining whether the
existing legal materials are sufficiently directed at the present
15. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 133 (2011) (arguing that
“[d]isagreements among lawyers about the best interpretation of particular
statutes are . . . symptoms of submerged and often unrecognized disagreements
about” such deeper and more refined issues as democratic, political, and moral
theory).
16. See infra Section II.A; see also John R. Searle, Searle versus Durkheim and the
Waves of Thought: Reply to Gross, in 6 ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 57, 58 (2006).
17. Cf. WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, THE PAUL CARUS LECTURES: THE ROOTS OF
REFERENCE 51 (1974) (“It is one thing to learn the difference between right and
wrong, and another thing to suit the action to the word.”).
18. See infra Section II.A.1.
19. See infra Sections II.A.1–2; see also JOHN R. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL
WORLD: THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN CIVILIZATION 154–55 (2010) [hereinafter,
SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD]
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circumstances, and whether they provide a solution to the new
matter with sufficient exactness. Accordingly, this article will discuss
the logical structure of institutions, with a focus on the “deontic”
commitments—i.e., rights, obligations, duties, entitlements, and so
forth—that institutions engender, and the “exactness” and
20
“intentionality” constraints on such institutional power. It also
invokes the familiar notion of “persuasive authority,” albeit from a
new angle, to explain how institutions evolve in the face of those
21
constraints.
Next this article will discuss the emergence of legal institutions
22
as a vehicle for regulating interactions and transactions. These are
the primary units of human social endeavor over which law
exercises its institutional authority, regardless of any larger ends
that law’s regulatory apparatus may be aimed at achieving. Law’s
institutional constraints must permit the legal system to function as
intended, and must ensure that it remain capable of regulating the
relevant social transactions. Accordingly, this article will next focus
on how understanding institutional structures and constraints may
23
affect our theory of law.
Finally this article will demonstrate that the foregoing analysis
of institutional logic, as applied to law, best explains the
24
phenomenon in law well-described as theoretical controversy.
Rather than pointing primarily to a moral ground for legal validity,
controversy in law arises in the first instance when it is uncertain
whether existing law has created rights, duties, and obligations with
a precision sufficient to inform the new exercise and whether, or in
which way, the prior legal materials have been “directed at” the
25
present circumstance. In this regard, theorists have traditionally
been too eager to overlook disagreement about whether and how
past legal materials and judicial decisions may fit the new situation,
26
and have leapt too readily to the realm of justification.
20. See infra Sections II.A.1–2; SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note
19, at 152–55.
21. See infra Section II.B.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 25.
26. E.g., HART, supra note 3, at 253 (explaining that, for Dworkin, “the truth
of any proposition of law ultimately depends on the truth of a moral judgment as
to what best justifies and since for him moral judgments are essentially
controversial, so are all propositions of law”).
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II. THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF INSTITUTIONS
A.

Searlean Analysis

For several decades, John R. Searle has been an influential
27
philosopher of mind, language, and consciousness. In the 1990s,
he linked his thinking in those areas to ideas about the ways in
which people organize their interactions and structure society, and
has thereby become the leading philosopher of social and
28
institutional reality.
1.

What Is an Institution?

The theory of intentional states of the mind provides the
crossway, in Searle’s thesis, from consciousness to social structures.
Intentional mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and ordinary
intentions, are those that are directed to, and are about, things in
29
the world. These need not be conscious states; I may believe that
the Brooklyn Bridge spans the East River even when not thinking
about this.
30
There is also such a thing as collective intentionality. If we are
sponsoring a conference on collective intentionality, or about Star
Trek, then to that extent, and in that endeavor, we share certain
intentional states such as beliefs and ordinary intentions, probably
31
also desires, hopes, and fears. Searle sees limitations in the work
of the pioneering philosophers addressing collective intentionality
because they have mostly presupposed that collective or “we”

27. E.g., John R. Searle, Meaning and Speech Acts, 71 PHIL. REV. 423, 423–32
(1962); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 33
(1969) [hereinafter SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS], JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF
THE MIND (1992); JOHN R. SEARLE, THE MYSTERY OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1997); JOHN R.
SEARLE, CONSCIOUSNESS AND LANGUAGE (2002).
28. See Margaret Gilbert, Searle and Collective Intentions, in INTENTIONAL ACTS
AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTS: ESSAYS ON JOHN SEARLE’S SOCIAL ONTOLOGY 31, 31
(Savas L. Tsohatzidis ed., 2007) (noting Searle’s “classic” 1990 work in the nascent
field of the philosophy of social phenomena).
29. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 25.
30. See John R. Searle, Collective Intentions and Actions, in INTENTIONS IN
COMMUNICATION 401–16 (Philip R. Cohen et al. eds., 1990); JOHN R. SEARLE, THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 25 (1995) [hereinafter SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF
SOCIAL REALITY].
31. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 25.
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intentions are reducible to individual or “I” intentions. Searle
argues that collective intentions are “biologically primitive”
phenomena not reducible to individual ones: “There is no reason
why we cannot have an irreducible we-intention in each of our
33
heads when we are engaging in some cooperative activity.”
34
“[S]ocial facts” are collective intentional facts. Even so, these
facts are not particularly human. Lions and wolves hunt in packs,
birds build a nest together, and ants and bees engage in highly
35
sophisticated group activities. A more complex form of social fact
emerges when the group assigns a function to a thing. A branch
can be used to perch on. A rock can be used to smash a coconut.
But at this level, the object as it physically exists in the world allows
36
it to function in that way, and its intrinsic physical features suffice.
Institutional facts are a certain kind of social fact. This
uniquely human level of reality begins with the assignment of
functions that can be fulfilled by virtue of collective recognition
and human cooperation, and not because of an object’s intrinsic
37
physical features. If collective acceptance underwrites the
assignment of a function at this level, then the entity charged with

32. See generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION 143–61 (1999);
MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 432–36 (Georg Meggle ed., 1989); SEUMAS
MILLER, SOCIAL ACTION: A TELEOLOGICAL ACCOUNT 68, 71–74, 80 (Cambridge U.
Press 2001).
33. SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 24; SEARLE,
MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 47. For a competing position, see
Seumas Miller, Joint Action: The Individual Strikes Back, in ESSAYS ON JOHN SEARLE’S
SOCIAL ONTOLOGY, supra note 28, at 73 [hereinafter Miller, Joint Action] (noting
that “the constitutive attitudes involved in joint actions are individual attitudes;
there are no sui generis we-attitudes”); see also GILBERT, supra note 32, at 432
(attempting to frame a middle way, stating, “[t]he conclusion seems to be that
humans as singular agents and humans as members of plural subjects are ontologically
on a par. Neither is prior as far as ontology goes”).
34. SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 122.
35. See JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIETY: PHILOSOPHY IN THE
REAL WORLD 121 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson eds., 1999). Some critics say that Searle
gives non-human animals too much credit, because while these may exhibit
complex socially-coordinated behavior, they “do not really have shared or
collective intentionality of the human kind.” Hannes Rakoczy & Michael
Tomasello, The Ontogeny of Social Ontology: Steps to Shared Intentionality and Status
Functions, in ESSAYS ON JOHN SEARLE’S SOCIAL ONTOLOGY, supra note 28, at 113–14.
This debate is too fine-tuned for present purposes.
36. SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 38–39.
37. Id. at 123–24.
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fulfilling the function takes on a certain status, and the assignment
38
is therefore one of a “status-function.”
Searle’s oft-stated example of the assignment of a status
function imagines a primitive tribe building a wall around its
territory. Over time, the wall erodes and eventually leaves only a
line of stones on the ground. Now, however, rather than a wall
functioning to keep neighbors out by virtue of its physical
characteristics, the larger community collectively recognizes and
39
accepts the boundary symbolized by the line of stones. A
normative reality, unique to human culture, has emerged separate
40
and apart from the physicality of the entities involved. Nonhuman animals might be trained not to cross a line, perhaps in
41
response to stimuli and conditioning, but their natural behavior
would arise from a disposition, and likely not from the collective
42
acceptance of a norm.
The logical structure of the assignment of status functions in
43
human culture is “X counts as Y in context C.” Because this
assignment does not depend on the brute physical structure of the
thing at issue, language is typically the necessary medium by which
44
X may count as Y in context C. The new status exists only by
convention, and “words or other symbolic means” permit the
community to signify thing X as having meaning and status Y. The
social practice might be to treat Sitting Bull as chief, but that
symbolic move requires thoughts and language is the vehicle of
45
such thoughts. At this symbolic level, a normative reality emerges
in which community members develop an evaluative attitude and

38. Id. at 123.
39. Id. at 39–40.
40. Id.
41. Ivan P. Pavlov, The Conditioned Reflex, in I.P. PAVLOV: SELECTED WORKS 245,
248 (J. Gibbons ed., S. Belsky trans., 1955).
42. See SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 71.
43. See SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 20; see John R.
Searle, What Is an Institution?, 1 J. INST. ECON. 1, 22 (2005).
44. SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 69; cf.
Gertrude Elizabeth M. Anscombe, On Brute Facts, 18 ANALYSIS 69, 71 (1958)
(describing “brute” institutional facts as “the facts which held, and in virtue of
which, in a proper context, such-and-such a description is true or false, and which
are more ‘brute’ than the alleged fact answering to that description”).
45. SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 73 (noting
that strictly speaking, any conventional marker will fill this role).
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justified expectations that others will adhere to the status functions
46
in play.
Searle’s next moves are particularly relevant to our analysis of
47
law as an institutional phenomenon. To advance from private
expectations to social structures and the creation and maintenance
of institutions, those community members need to declare their
48
status in some way, implicitly or expressly. It is when participants
commit themselves in a public way to satisfy expectations,
“according to the normative conventions of a language,” that they
49
create obligations and other sorts of deontic commitments. Legal
and governmental officials take an oath of office, those marrying
say “I do,” the note in one’s hand declares itself legal tender for all
debts, and so forth.
Because institutional facts do not flow from the mere physical
presence of the objects and entities comprising the institution,
46. See Scott Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L.J. 1160, 1196
(2015) (quoting DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 7, at 57); cf.
Steven Schaus, How to Think About Law as Morality: A Comment on Greenberg and
Hershovitz, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 224, 236 (2015) (“Obligatory actions are those we
are accountable to others (including ourselves and perhaps everyone) for
performing, and this sets them apart from actions that are only recommended.”).
47. These are not necessarily next in a chronological or historical sense, but
rather in a logical or conceptual sense, such that what has been stated so far are
the more basic components of an explanation of institutional reality. See Aristotle,
Metaphysics VII § 1028a 34–36, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORDS OF ARISTOTLE 1623–24
(Jonathan Barnes ed., rev. Oxford trans., 1984) (1956).
48. See SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 85; cf. SAMUEL
WILLISTON, SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW 127 (Baker, Voorhis & Co. ed.,
1929) (opining that, “to be useful,” legal doctrines must be capable of being
understood by the ordinary citizen, hence be declared clearly); JÜRGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY 232–33 (William Rehg trans., The MIT Press 1998) (1992) (proffering
a similar view).
49. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 88 (bypassing the
distinction that should be made between normativity and deontology); cf. Jules L.
Coleman, Mistakes, Misunderstandings, and Misalignments, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 541,
557 (2012) (“It is important to distinguish between the deontic and nondeontic
areas of the normative landscape. Sometimes we assess behavior as careless,
inattentive; but we recognize that even careless and inattentive behavior may
provide benefits—and not merely to those who benefit by saving the costs of
greater attentiveness or care. Other times, we characterize our conduct in terms of
duties and rights, powers and liberties: claims we have against others, authority we
have over them, and demands that we can stand or call upon. Roughly, the latter is
part of the deontic area of the normative landscape; the former is not, or at least
need not be.”).
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there must be a collective recognition, and some level of
acceptance, of the deontic status of the individuals, objects,
50
procedures, forms and so forth, that make up the institution. This
collective recognition might well be reducible to individual
recognition in tandem with community members’ mutual beliefs
51
about how things are.
But more than collective recognition is required for the
institution to function. People must act in reliance upon, and in
conformity with, the rights and obligations engendered by the
institution. In other words, for non-accidental institutional
transactions to occur, there must be not only collective recognition,
52
but also cooperation and a non-reducible collective intentionality.
Such transactions are minimally cooperative endeavors at the least,
rooted in a collective intention to cooperate, and usually based on
a mutual commitment to a common set of rights and obligations
53
sustained by constitutive and regulative institutional rules.
Now we have arrived at a fairly robust description of
institutional reality. There are a few more things that should be
said about the logic of this reality, as Searle has argued it. As
54
shown, an institution must be constituted by rules that permit the
individuals, entities, or objects involved to “count as” having a
certain significance and status within the institution. A rule
creating landlords’ rights to evict tenants invests them with a status
by which they wield certain powers of eviction, and makes this the
55
case by representing it as being the case. In linguistic terms, the

50. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 57.
51. Id. at 57–58.
52. See infra note 175 and accompanying text (explaining that, in order for
institutional transactions to successfully occur, collective recognition must be
supplemented by some minimal level of cooperation, and the institutional rules be
deemed to be reasons for the actors’ conduct).
53. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 58 (using the
example of the institution of money, explaining that whereas the “existence” of
this institution may merely require collective recognition, the ability to engage in
monetary transactions requires a further level of cooperation).
54. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (explaining the conceptual
step taken from assignment to functions, based on the physical attributes of the
entity at issue, to the assignment of status functions separate and apart from the
physicality of the entities involved).
55. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 97.
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constitutive rule announced by legal officials is a speech act known
56
as a “standing declaration.”
In some contrast, institutions are also comprised of other sorts
of rules, these being regulative rules that govern behavior within
57
the institution. Rules requiring landlords to make necessary
repairs to a dwelling, or tenants to pay their rent on time, are
examples of regulative rules. And these, in linguistic terms, are
58
known as “standing [d]irectives.”
It is not necessary that individual members of an institutional
community subjectively “approve” of the institution or its rules.
Even a transaction permeated with fear and loathing depends on a
59
minimum level of cooperative intention. The ability to transact
within the institution in all events requires cooperative behavior
manifesting the “we” intention characterizing a non-reducible
60
collective intentionality. As a product of the collective recognition
and understanding of the rights and obligations generated by status
functions, the institution provides participants with reasons for
61
action. The critical and sustaining feature of institutional reasons
for action is that these reasons are “desire-independent,” separate
and apart from what the participants may desire for themselves at
that moment, and arising from collective rights, obligations, and
62
duties. The landlord may not want to repair the plumbing, or the
63
tenant may not desire to pay the rent, but mostly they do so.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 103–04.
See Gilbert, supra note 28, at 38.
SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 103; cf. SAMANTHA
BESSON, THE MORALITY OF CONFLICT: REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT AND THE LAW 4
(2005) (noting that the law functions analogously to provide disputants with
reasons for settling their disagreements, namely, by “providing us with a way to
agree to disagree or agree on how to do so”).
62. See SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 70;
SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 127–31; cf. JOSEPH RAZ,
PRACTICAL REASONS AND NORMS 183 (Oxford U. Press, 1999) (1975) (explaining
that “[a]n exclusionary reason merely requires us to avoid something which other
reasons make legitimate, but do not require”). Searle dissents from classical views
of rationality, which deny the feasibility of desire-independent reasons for action.
See JOHN R. SEARLE, RATIONALITY IN ACTION 10, 26 (2001). As an aside, the subtle
distinctions between Searlean desire-independent reasons and Hartian and Razian
“content-independent” peremptory reasons become particularly interesting in
light of recent positivist views about the connection between law and morality.
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Now these are just John Searle’s views of the logic of
institutional reality, or at least an attempt to paraphrase them.
Other thinkers may have other views, although much of the debate
64
in this area focuses on Searle’s philosophy. We next ask, what are
the key implications of his theory, and what constraints do they
entail?
2.

Institutional Constraints

For Searle, the core feature of institutions is their structuring
of deontic power, a means by which people are induced to do what
65
the institution requires of them. This power usually resides in the
creation of desire-independent reasons for action, within the
66
institutional setting. In this regard, “A has power over S with
respect to action B if and only if A can intentionally get S to do
67
what A wants regarding B, whether S wants to do it or not.”
The sort of intentionality most important here is the ordinary
68
kind, by which A intends a certain outcome. If A intends that S
HERBERT L.A. HART, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in ESSAYS ON
BENTHAM 243–44 (1982); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 35–36 (Oxford
U. Press 1988) (1986).
63. See also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 22 (Yale Univ. Press rev. ed.
1969) (describing the ways in which “duties generally can be traced to the
principle of reciprocity,” such that, in the example just given, the landlord’s and
tenant’s desire-independent reasons will be interdependent).
64. See generally Miller, Joint Action, supra note 33; Mattia Gallotti & John
Michael, Objects in Mind, in 4 STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIALITY:
PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL ONTOLOGY AND SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 5 (Mattia Gallotti &
John Michael eds., 2014) (“The recent debate on social facts has grown from the
pioneering work of John Searle, whose conceptual apparatus is now taken widely,
though not unquestionably, as the starting point of most analyses of social
ontology.”).
65. See SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 148–51, 169.
66. JOHN R. SEARLE, FREEDOM AND NEUROBIOLOGY: REFLECTIONS ON FREE WILL,
LANGUAGE, AND POLITICAL POWER 9 (2007) [hereinafter SEARLE, FREEDOM AND
NEUROBIOLOGY].
67. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 151.
68. See Leo Zaibert, Intentions, Promises, and Obligations, in CONTEMPORARY
PHILOSOPHY IN FOCUS 52, 60 (Barry Smith ed., 2003) (suggesting that the
distinctions Searle draws in other work—differentiating between “prior intentions”
and “intentions-in-action,”—may be of limited usefulness even in the context of
Searle’s own theory); see also SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 211, 213, 309 (“[T]he
institutionality [sic] of law is ultimately grounded in intentions.”). This analysis is
moored in a view that likens laws to plans, and law to a planning mechanism
aimed at settling society’s moral disputes. Shapiro’s approach thereby appears to
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stop his car at the corner and has the capability and authority to
erect a stop sign there, then A has power over S in that context.
Other sorts of intentional content will also come into play, such as
the parties’ beliefs about driving and road signs, their fears or
anxieties about being ticketed by the police, and their hopes
69
concerning safety.
Human beings ordinarily exercise power through their speech
70
acts and the typical form of this exercise is the standing directive.
So this exercise of power must have an intentional, or propositional
content, meaning that the exercise of power must be about, or be
71
directed at, something. The propositional content should convey
72
conditions capable of being satisfied by the institutional actors.
Searle describes two relevant constraints on the concept of
power that inform the logic of institutional reality. First, the
concept of power is logically connected to the concept of the
intentional exercise of power—toward what end is the power
intended, believed or perhaps desired to be exercised; Searle calls
73
this the “intentionality constraint.” “The intentional exercise of
power may have unintended consequences,” and the intention may
74
sometimes even be unconscious. Perhaps, for example, the
crossing guard moves the child on towards school while being
conscious only of getting her to the other side of the street.
Nevertheless, the crossing guard’s authority arises in the context of
the institution’s collective intention to educate the child.
Notably, intentionality in the ordinary sense of intending a
certain outcome is self-referential. If we intend the object in the
75
corner to be a chair, we must think of it as a chair. If one intends
to get to Chicago by train, in order for this intention to be satisfied,
rely on intentionality as limited to ordinary intentions, those that “take plans as
their objects.” Id. at 127.
69. See SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 25.
70. Id. at 97.
71. Fred I. Dretske, The Intentionality of Cognitive States, in 5 MIDWEST STUDIES
IN PHILOSOPHY 281 (Peter A. French et al. eds., 1980), reprinted in THE NATURE OF
MIND 354, 354 (David M. Rosenthal ed., 1991).
72. Cf. SCOTT SOAMES, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA—AND OTHER
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 75 (2014) (arguing that “we must derive
the intentionality of propositions from the intentionality of those who entertain
them”).
73. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 151.
74. Id. at 151.
75. SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 53.
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the intention itself must figure causally in the outcome, here
76
arriving in Chicago by train. The same would not be the case if we
simply desired to get to Chicago, without yet intending how to
bring this about.
The second constraint on the concept of power is the
77
“exactness constraint.” For the institution to function, and for
participants to recognize its nature and know what may be
expected of them, the intentional content of the power relations
upholding the institution—that is, what has been collectively
intended and believed to be the case—should be sufficiently
78
specified. Participants in the institution must be capable of
knowing, although they need not actually know, what is expected of
them, and more generally what status-functions have been
79
assigned.
Recall that Searle’s formula for constitutive rules is: fact “X
80
counts as status Y in context C.” The Y term is not sustained by
virtue of the physicality of the object or entity, and so there must be
an intersubjective appreciation, and collective acceptance, of the
81
assignment of the status-function. The assignment must be
82
sufficiently specified to permit such collective recognition. It is
also a condition of ascribing legitimacy to an exercise of power that
one be able to say who holds the power, who is subject to that
83
power, and what is the intended effect of its exercise. If the logic
of institutional reality rests on intended outcomes, assigned status
functions, collectively-held intentions, and collective recognition or
acceptance of the resulting institutional structures, as Searle

76. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 36.
77. Id. at 152.
78. Id.
79. Id. Of course, participants in an institution need not “discuss” power
even when exercising or being affected by it. However, status functions must be
assigned with sufficient exactness to render such a discussion possible in a
“satisfactory” way.
80. See SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 40.
81. Id. at 39–41; see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW
AND MORALITY 147 (2d ed. 2009) (saying, for example, that “laws are normally the
product of authoritative acts”).
82. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 152.
83. See id. at 155; see also ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY
21 (2d ed. 2005) (“From the perspective of pragmatics, an act of communication
succeeds if and only if the hearer recognizes S’s intention.”).
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84

contends, there will have to be some level of specificity in the
intentions and assignments underlying the deontic powers thereby
85
created and sustained.
The Finnish moral and social philosopher Raimo Tuomela has
86
articulated a quite Searlean account of social structures. He
specifies that several kinds of activities or entities can qualify as a
87
social institution. These include social practices (such as sauna
bathing on Saturdays in Finland), objects (such as money),
individual properties (such as ownership), linguistic entities (such
as natural language), interpersonal states (such as marriage), and
social organizations, most of which are typically society-wide, norm88
governed group practices. He interestingly adds, however, that
84. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 57; cf. id. at 103–04
(“One mark of recognition or acceptance is continued usage of the institution and
institutional facts . . . . Acceptance need not take the form of an explicit speech act
and can range all the way from enthusiastic endorsement to grudging
acquiescence.”). Again, while Searle’s social ontology is the most influential
programme at play in the area of social philosophy, and is enlisted as a foundation
for this Article’s discussion of controversy in law, each of his contentions may be
subject to dispute and interpretation. E.g., George P. Fletcher, Law, in
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY IN FOCUS 85, 99 (Barry Smith ed., 2003) (“When
modern legislatures start enacting new laws, these laws become binding—at least
according to the conventional view—not because they are accepted but because
they are validly enacted.”).
85. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 181, 181 (1988) (effectively referring to the functional of
competition over the federal government’s intentionality in assigning state and
federal officials the status of implementing federal law); Note, Reforming the Initial
Sale Requirements of the Private Placement Exemption, 86 HARV. L. REV. 403, 407 (1972)
(suggesting that the Supreme Court’s intended outcomes will be defeated when its
stated standards “are so vague that they do not offer a workable basis” for
construing statutes); cf. In re Williams, No. 1999CA000128, 2000 WL 222033, at *2
(Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2000) (emphasizing that the “vagueness doctrine . . .
applies to legislation that lacks clarity and precision”).
86. RAIMO TUOMELA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIALITY: THE SHARED POINT OF
VIEW 182–211 (Oxford U. Press, 2007). Whereas Searle grounds his analysis in the
deontic status and status functions informing the logic of institutions, Tuomela’s
focus is more broadly concerned with the conceptual and social status that
characterizes institutional reality and he deems Searle’s view to involve a
“stronger” kind of social institution. Id. at 196–97; see id. at 203 (saying that
“Searlean deontic status can be reinterpreted to be a subcase” of Tuomela’s
expression of a social institution). In all events, these distinctions should not come
into serious play regarding law and legal institutions.
87. Id. at 194.
88. Id.
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“[o]nly group items that are represented as existing by the group
89
are institutional.” This should not mean that all community
members will have to be conscious of the norm or practice, or even
support these without conflict; it might be the case that a small
group of officials specify the norm, rule, or structure, so long as the
larger group collectively recognizes the general ethos upon which
90
the officials may act. One further insight by Searle, significant
enough to keep in mind, is that higher levels of status functions can
be imposed on entities that have previously been assigned status
91
functions. A relatively simple institution can thereby engender a
more complex one. Promises, for instance, have status functions
because they are collectively recognized as carrying obligations or
92
duties to make good on the promise. But in a certain setting, and
at a logically higher level—one, that is, that refers to, incorporates,
and contextualizes the deontic force of the promise as such—a
promise can create a contract or count as a necessary step toward
93
marriage.
More schematically, in the collective intentional assignment of
the form, “X counts as Y in context C,” the Y term in the simpler
94
institution can become the X term in the more complex one.
Stones on the ground may count as a boundary neighbors
collectively accept they should not cross in the simpler setting, but
iterating upward the boundary may mark off a separate political or
quasi-political territory. Or as Searle puts it, an utterance (X1) may
count as a promise (Y1) in C1, but under certain circumstances C2,
95
that very promise (X2) counts as a contract (Y2). Now with the
contract itself as a context (or Y2 = C3), a particular action as X3
96
can count as its breach (Y3), and so on.
B.

The Logical Role of Persuasive Authority

We should now have approximately set out Searle’s project.
There is one refinement worth making for the legal theory context,
and in respect of institutions generally. This refinement is
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
See id. at 31.
SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 80.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 125.
Id.
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important because institutional philosophy has not yet fully fleshed
out the logic of institutional evolution. The literature speaks to the
logical role played by status function assignments within the
97
institution, but not yet the structural factors motivating and
legitimizing the evolution of such assignments and institutional
change over time. The concept of persuasive authority should
98
provide a fruitful research program in this regard.
Searle does not distinguish much between power and
99
authority. This is not to say that he finds them synonymous;
rather, authority falls within the range of deontic powers, which for
Searle “are rights, duties, obligations, authorizations, permissions,
100
privileges, authority and the like.” Although Searle does not say
more about the discrete nature of authority, he seems to use the
term in a familiar way. His sense of “authority” is the one that flows
both from and constitutes institutional power, and that is
101
interwoven with duties, rights, and obligations. As one example,
an official within an institution will have the authority to perform
certain acts.
There is another sense of “authority” that is sometimes
complimentary, but not subordinate or tantamount, to institutional
deontic power. In this second sense, authority is minimally a
linguistic source capable of influencing intentional states, but
102
without imposing obligations. In everyday parlance we speak of
103
the “power to persuade.” A linguistic source is presented or
becomes available in some way, rises to conscious awareness, and
104
carries an influential force capable of affecting beliefs.
97. See, e.g., SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 46.
98. See generally Chad Flanders, Towards a Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62
OKLA. L. REV. 55, 63–64 (2009).
99. See, e.g., SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 8–9
(generally classifying “rights, duties, obligations, requirements, permissions,
authorizations, entitlements, and so on” as “deontic powers” engendered and
carried by status functions).
100. SEARLE, FREEDOM AND NEUROBIOLOGY, supra note 66, at 98.
101. Id.
102. E.g., NICHOLAS HARPSFIELD, TREATISE ON THE PRETENDED DIVORCE
BETWEEN HENRY VIII AND CATHERINE OF ARAGON 232 (Camden Society 1878)
(stating, “[t]hen lasheth he forth many authorities and examples”).
103. Henry P. Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of
State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1934 (2003) (discussing
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)).
104. Cf. Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial
Responsibility, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 774–75 (1999) (struggling to convey a sense of
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The two senses of authority may in general be aligned as
“practical” and “theoretical,” respectively. Much has been written
about the effects of the former sort of authority within and upon
105
institutions, particularly law. Theoretical authority, on the other
hand, is typically rooted in an expertise, but usually without the
intent and ability to impose duties that characterize practical
106
authority. This sort of authority may be an object, perhaps a
document, an affair, individual, or entity, always linguistically
107
expressed, that may originate within the institution or that may
108
derive from an “other-institutional” or non-institutional source.
Consider, for instance, two books about a national park. One
conveys authority in the first sense. It sets out the rules and
regulations for use of the park (Searle’s “standing directives”),
discusses the agency charged with issuing those rules, and cites the
statute establishing (by “standing declaration” in Searle’s
terminology) the agency and the regulatory scheme for the
national park. The second book, perhaps issued by an unaffiliated
group of “friends of the park,” is dedicated to revealing scenic
routes that may be taken in the park, the location of its streams and
109
waterfalls, and so forth. The interesting aspect of this example is

the search for persuasive authority in the legal context, including the search for
authority “in the context of ancestral judicial experience”).
105. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 37 (Clarendon Press 1986)
(“Orders and commands are among the expressions typical of practical authority.
Only those who claim authority can command.”).
106. Compare HERBERT L.A. HART, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in
READINGS IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY: AUTHORITY 92, 107 (Joseph Raz ed.,
1990) (noting that theoretical authorities may hold sway over matters of belief
rather than conduct), with Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification, in READINGS IN
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY: AUTHORITY 115, 123 (Joseph Raz ed., 1990)
(explaining that practical authorities may fulfill the function of imposing duties,
among other functions).
107. The persuasive source contemplated here originates within, or has been
issued by, the institution, but not as an item imbued with deontic powers. See infra
note 109.
108. Exemplifying the use of other-institutional sources as persuasive
authorities in the legal context, for example, is Justice John Paul Stevens opinion
in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988), taking guidance from the
policies of several foreign nations concerning the death penalty.
109. The book on scenic routes may, of course, have been issued by the
agency itself in charge of the park, hence institutionally, and yet, because of its
content and intended purpose, does not carry deontic authority. But right now we
are interested only in the possibility that the source is extra-institutional.
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the non- or other-institutional source of the authority. The
institution may incorporate or adopt the authority, perhaps by
offering the “friends” book at the park’s gift shop, or by
recommending it to visitors. In this case, the institution will have
changed, to that extent.
Nor is the sort of authority just discussed—that is, of an
influential or persuasive source—the same as bare influence. Many
extra-institutional
factors,
including
weather
conditions,
manipulations of a resource, and so on, may exert bare influence
110
over institutions. These will not qualify as persuasive authority.
Nor need the “exercise” of influence, a human endeavor, be
linguistic, as when someone pulls the lever that may release the
flood waters. These sorts of events and efforts, however, also do not
qualify as “authority.”
But more precisely, the sort of persuasive authority we are
concerned with here need not necessarily be theoretical, and need
not necessarily embody any expertise. It is, as stated, a linguistic
source capable of influencing intentional states, but without
111
imposing obligations. This persuasive authority may comprise a
system of background norms or an independently existing
institution. Perhaps it is a dress code, for example, or Robert’s
Rules of Order, systems of norms not adopted by the particular
institution at issue. Once adopted, however, those authorities may
112
now be enforced in the context of the adoptive institution.
Absent persuasive authority or other outside influence, it
would be difficult to explain how institutions evolve. For example,
the medieval community may decide, by some accepted procedure,
to use squirrel pelt as their form of money; until the group
110. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 62, at 99 (noting that such exertions of influence
as manipulation of the money supply will affect “people’s reasons for action,” but
are “not the exercise of normative powers”).
111. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
112. Cf. Amichai Magen, The Rule of Law and Its Promotion Abroad: Three
Problems of Scope, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 51, 113–14 (2009) (“Voluntary lesson drawing,
according to [Richard] Rose, occurs when domestic policy-makers are dissatisfied
with the existing state of affairs; define the problem and mark it as potentially
solvable through the adoption of new rules, institutions or policies; look outside
their domestic system to an external source identified as a potential model for
emulation; form the perception that the external practices, rules or institutions
are successful in solving difficulties identical, or at least comparable to those at
home; and determine that the external rules are not only technically transferable,
but politically acceptable.”).
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collectively accepts this change, squirrel pelt does not have the
status or function of money within that institution, and is an extra113
institutional item. This is a trivial point on its own. However,
perhaps the institutional criteria for selecting the medium of
exchange are portability and intrinsic value, being a medium not
114
too plentiful yet not too scarce. Less than ideal experience with
115
squirrel pelt exchange leads to mammalogical inquiry, and soon
the institutional criteria themselves are modified to include
durability and divisibility. Extra-institutional persuasive authority—
which in law may derive either from non-legal sources or from
precedents set down in other jurisdictions—has guided
116
institutional evolution.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS
As a conceptual matter, people interact prior to, and without
the necessity of, a legal system. We will stipulate that when an
interaction results in gain or loss, the interaction is a transaction.
The set of interactions that are transactions may be equal to or
some portion of the full set of interactions. Some would say that the
set of transactions is necessarily greater, since perhaps we can
117
effectively transact at a distance without interacting. But here we
presuppose that any such transaction suffices to be deemed an
interaction, that is, some sort of action or influence upon another
that may or may not involve gain or loss.

113. See TUOMELA, supra note 86, at 183, 186.
114. WILLIAM S. JEVONS, MONEY AND THE MECHANISM OF EXCHANGE 25–26
(Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. eds., 7th ed. 1885) (noting many of the types of
objects that have been used as currency in various cultures, such as whale’s teeth
by the Fijians, the Egyptians’ engraved stones, corn by the Norwegians and ancient
Greeks, olive oil in the Ionian Islands, and cacao nuts in the Yucutan).
115. See NORTH AMERICAN FUR AUCTIONS, WILD FUR PELT HANDLING MANUAL 30
(2009) (instructing that for use of a squirrel pelt, “The front feet should be cut off
close to the body, leaving just enough to tuck in to the fur side. The tail must be
split. Not doing this can result in taint due to the lack of exposure to the air.”).
116. See, e.g., Reid v. Life Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 677, 680 (4th Cir. 1983) (looking
to precedents in other jurisdictions for persuasive authority); cf. City of Milwaukee
v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul. & Pac. R.R. (Milwaukee Road), 269 N.W. 688, 689 (Wis.
1936); United States v. Magluta, 198 F.3d 1265, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A] district
court’s error is not ‘plain’ or ‘obvious’ if there is no precedent directly resolving
an issue.”), vacated on other grounds, 203 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2000).
117. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law,
111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1321 (2002).

7 (Do Not Delete)

246

3/24/2016 7:56 PM

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:225

Transacting happens in various ways, both intentionally and
accidentally. People injure one another, sometimes intentionally,
118
sometimes accidentally. They make promises, carve out territory
and spaces for living and for more transacting, and also plan for
lots of things, including death. Something happens between us
once and then twice. We become motivated, by our psychology and
nature, to structure the next interaction efficiently because the
119
alternative is waste.
As transactions, broadly defined to include accidental
occurrences, take place in the pre-legal social group—promising,
injuring, planning and so forth—they give rise to entitlements,
commitments, obligations, and other deontic facts, including
120
deontic emotions such as blame and resentment.
Questions
inevitably arise about how to organize, coordinate, and prioritize
those obligations, resentments, powers, and practiced means to
121
intended ends. Security and liberty interests are at stake and must
be balanced. Without a structure for accomplishing these ends,
however, the smooth functioning of the group cannot get off the
ground or continue. A legal system emerges, which begins with
122
collectively-recognized regulative and constitutive rules. Legal
practice arising in the legal system brings with it an argumentative
structure and argument about the nature of that argumentative
123
structure.
118. See, e.g., Coleman v. Twin Coast Newspaper, Inc., 346 P.2d 488, 490 (Cal.
1959) (“[A] right to relief arising out of the same transaction or series of
transactions exists where several plaintiffs sue for personal injuries suffered in the
same accident.”).
119. Cf. Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, Recognizing Faces of Other Ethnic Groups, 7
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 36, 64 (2001) (describing how a certain face recognition
schema “allows for quicker and more effective processing, just as other types of
recurring patterns are processed more efficiently and automatically”).
120. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 147–48; see also
Carla Bagnoli, INTRODUCTION TO MORALITY AND THE EMOTIONS 1, 26 (Carla Bagnoli
ed., 2011).
121. See Joseph Raz, Introduction to AUTHORITY 1, 7 (Joseph Raz ed., 1990)
(expressing the view that “the need to secure coordination is one of the main
arguments for political authority”).
122. See Fletcher, supra note 84, at 85–86.
123. See generally DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 7, at 24–26;
Peder B. Hong, A Theory of Final Argument in Civil Trials, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 31, 55
(1997); cf. Colin S. Diver, Sound Governance and Sound Law—Administrative Law:
Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1436, 1446 (1991) (book
review) (questioning whether “judicial pluralism” is justified, given the varied
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This view has affinities with Dworkin, for whom law’s “most
abstract and fundamental” point was to “guide and constrain”
124
governmental coercion. This approach constructively interprets
past political decisions and thereby views those decisions in their
best light from a moral point of view to determine when collective
125
force is justified. There is a logic to constructive interpretation by
which the project manifests in various stages, each involving a
126
“different degree[] of consensus” within the community.
Although Dworkin did not speak in terms of the logical structure of
his approach, he made it clear that the first stage—the “pre127
interpretive” stage—was conceptually prior. This is the stage at
which we identify the rules and standards, perhaps the statutory
words, taken to provide the tentative content of the practice, but at
128
which “a very great degree of consensus is needed.”
For Dworkin, skepticism about whether a regime resting on
little more than the raw data identified at the pre-interpretive stage
comprises anything beyond a tentative or minimally “legal” system
129
is justified. That view seems wise. At the same time, Dworkin’s
pre-interpretive stage generally coincides with what we have just
described as the conceptually primary stage characterizing the
130
emergence of a legal system. Dworkin’s second, “interpretive,”
and third, “post-interpretive,” stages involve increasing levels of
disputation concerning which outcomes best fit and justify the
prior materials, and correspondingly lesser degrees of community
consensus, and hence the proliferation of theoretical
131
disagreement.
If we go a bit further and ask toward what end government
coercion would be exercised in the first place, the answer by our
model is to regulate transactions, broadly defined, as these
reasoning and outcomes that would depend “on the convictions of the judge or
panel involved”).
124. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 93.
125. Id.; HART, supra note 3, at 248.
126. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 65.
127. Id. at 65–66.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 103–04.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 120–23 (suggesting that human
interactions engender promising, injuring, planning, and so forth, these giving
rise to deontic commitments, rights and obligations, and the inception of primary
legal rules and principles).
131. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 66–67.
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naturally arise within the community. This regulative apparatus, in
turn, may serve any of a number of political ends, including social
domination, dispute resolution, or other ends. In all events, the
conceptually prior scheme—or “pre-interpretive” stage in
Dworkinian terms—consists in regulative and constitutive rules
132
and, perhaps, standards.
The definitions of regulative and constitutive rules at least
appear to neatly distinguish them. Frederick Schauer explains that
constitutive rules are rules that “create the very possibility of
engaging in conduct of a certain kind. They define and thereby
133
constitute activities that could not otherwise even exist.” The
rules of chess create the possibility of playing chess; they do not,
however, make possible the movement of wooden medieval pieces
on a checkered board. Regulative rules, on the other hand, are
seen as governing antecedently or independently existing behavior
134
and behavioral patterns. In practice, however, rules that may be
thought of as constitutive—often, but certainly not always, being
135
procedural—“have their regulative side.”
Thus, to some
significant extent, the distinction between regulative and
136
constitutive rules will be vague.
The rules of law are sometimes constitutive of state-enforced
rights and obligations. Due process principles, for example, may
constitute the procedural fairness that is due to parties facing
132. See Jody S. Kraus, Legal Determinacy and Moral Justification, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1773, 1786 (2006).
133. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 6 (Tony Honoré & Joseph Raz
eds., 1991); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 25–28 (1955).
134. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS, supra note 27, at 33.
135. SCHAUER, supra note 133, at 7; cf. Nimer Sultany, The State of Progressive
Constitutional Theory: The Paradox of Constitutional Democracy and the Project of Political
Justification, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 371, 397–98 (2012) (noting one scholar’s
argument “that constitutional self-binding is both regulative and constitutive,
limiting and creative, disabling and enabling”) (citing STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS
& CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 163 (1995)); RAZ, supra
note 62, at 109 (“There is nothing in Searle’s explanation to suggest that his
classification is exclusive, that the same rule cannot be both regulative and
constitutive.”).
136. E.g., Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, A Behavioral Critique of Searle’s Theory of
Institutions, in ESSAYS ON JOHN SEARLE’S SOCIAL ONTOLOGY, supra note 28, at 175,
178 (“Contracts are constitutive rules that define the rights and obligations of the
parties who enter into some exchange . . . . Yet, the exchange is not made possible
by the contract.”).
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137

punitive measures from legal adjudicators. Yet once the legal
system, or any other sort of institution, is functional, the
constitutive rules “lose their constitutive character within those
institutions, serving instead to regulate antecedently defined
138
behavior.”
As group members interacting—or at least theories about this
or the representations the members bring into the interactions—is
conceptually prior to their law, so is the community’s construction
of innumerable rights and obligations, balancing security and
liberty interests, conceptually, prior to law’s prescriptions. These
informal deontic structures evolve into webs of background norms
that both influence behavior and empower, subtly or bluntly,
139
coercive responses to violations of those norms. Courts develop
their embodied or practical philosophies by determining which
rights and obligations law should enforce. These, in turn,
140
dialectically influence the community’s norms. The legal system’s
coercive capability may not be strictly necessary to a concept of law,
but “in the world of law as it exists and as it is experienced,
141
coercion is rampant and sanctions are omnipresent.”
The legal system may create a rule for enforcing promises as
follows: “A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach
of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the
142
law in some way recognizes as a duty.” In the area of personal
injury, members of the group internalize a sense of obligation
when its breach gives rise to some level of collective resentment
because it violates a governing norm the group may reasonably be
143
expected to infer. People liberally assign fault, even when actual

137. ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND FUNCTION IN A LEGAL SYSTEM: A GENERAL
STUDY 343 (2006).
138. SCHAUER, supra note 133, at 7.
139. See generally SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 155;
ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 56 (Steven Lukes ed., W.D.
Halls trans., 1982) (1895),(“An outburst of collective emotion in a gathering . . . is
a product of shared existence, of actions and reactions called into play between
the consciousnesses of individuals.”).
140. See generally Janine Young Kim, Hate Crime Law and the Limits of
Inculpation, 84 NEB. L. REV. 846, 888 (2006).
141. Frederick Schauer, The Best Laid Plans, 120 YALE L.J. 586, 605 (2010).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
143. See generally Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, reprinted in MORAL
DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES 179, 197 (Stephen
Darwall et al. eds., Oxford U. Press 1997).
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fault is improbable. The legal system may declare that duty in tort
is an obligation or set of obligations to adhere to a particular
standard of care, which the law recognizes as binding across the
community, and for the injurious breach of which the law allows a
145
private remedy. Criminal law, as well as tort, may develop to
safeguard the community from freewheeling resorts to the vendetta
146
or blood feud.
As the legal system evolves, aiming to fulfill its primary mission
of regulating the people’s broad range of transactions, it is both the
sovereign’s unique governing apparatus, and abstractly
institutional. The notion that legal systems emerge to regulate
transactions is not intended to restrict our view of the range of
possible purposes that may drive the emergence or maintenance of
a legal system, or of any legal system. The primary engagement
between law and its subjects is at the level of the legal system’s
regulation of their transactions, which are a species of their
147
interactions. Toward which end law regulates these transactions,
whether this be social domination and control, dispute resolution,
the constructive ordering of norms or morality, or some other aim
or combination of aims, poses a different question.
Legal philosophers have not paid much recent attention to
law’s institutional constraints, which if soundly analyzed should
inform their view of law’s nature. Searle’s original and elegant
theory about institutions, whether accepted in whole or in part,
148
should significantly impact this discussion. Thinking about law’s
institutional nature may, in turn, help refocus our understanding
of controversy in law.

144. See Ray Glier, Dodgers’ Jones Plumbs Depths of Hitting Slump, N.Y. TIMES,
(Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/sports/baseball/22jones
.html?_r=0.
145. See Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 230 (Ariz. 2007); A.W. v. Lancaster Cty.
Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Neb. 2010).
146. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 53–54 (1983).
147. See supra text accompanying note 117.
148. See generally Fletcher, supra note 84, at 101 (noting that “[o]ur easy
reliance” upon Searle’s terminology “illustrates how useful Searle’s conceptual
framework can be in formulating views in legal philosophy”).
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IV. BECAUSE LEGAL SYSTEMS ARE INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS MUST APPLY TO THEM
Legal systems regulate transactions, but what regulates legal
systems? The answer should be, first, the structural requirements
that constrain all institutions, and, second, institution-specific
secondary rules that constrain the actions of legal officials. Of
these, structural constraints pertaining to all institutions must be
prior. Any secondary rule contrary to those constraints would
149
undermine the system’s institutional grounding.
If the logic of institutions entails that they are constrained by
intentionality and exactness conditions, then the same must hold
for law. The nature and complexity of legal systems as institutions
150
will diverge dramatically from that of other sorts of institutions.
Nevertheless, the strong thesis upholding the new social ontology is
that all human institutional reality derives from, and rests on, the
assignment of status functions and is constrained by conditions of
151
intentionality and exactness. Those constraints upon institutional
power should similarly constrain legal institutional power.
This is not necessarily to agree, with thinkers such as Scott
Hershovitz, who seeks to transcend the Hart-Dworkin debate, that
152
there is no distinctively legal domain of normativity. However, as
suggested earlier, human interactions and transactions, and the
range of deontic and normative phenomena which these give rise
153
to, are conceptually prior to the emergence of legal systems. To
that extent, the thesis here, like Hershovitz’s, may be characterized
154
as “eliminativist [sic].”

149. See generally FULLER, supra note 63, at 39 (demonstrating as a practical
matter, for instance, that a secondary rule prohibiting the issuance of any
additional rules, precluding the publication of rules which would permit subjects
to know what they are “expected to observe,” or other secondary rules which
would effectively defeat law’s intentionality and exactness constraints, would
thereby defeat the idea that there is “a legal system at all”).
150. See Schaus, supra note 46, at 236.
151. See SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 151–52.
152. See Hershovitz, supra note 46, at 1173–74.
153. See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text (positing a conceptual
ordering from the social engagement of human beings in interactions and
transactions, to the consequent emergence of rights and obligations, and, on that
conceptual foundation, to the initiation of a legal system).
154. Hershovitz, supra note 46, at 1193–95.
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It may nevertheless seem to be somewhat of a non sequitur to
take the further step, with Dworkin in his wonderful final book
Justice for Hedgehogs, of viewing law as a branch of political
155
morality. Hershovitz, however, takes the eliminativist position to
“vindicate[] Dworkin’s suggestion that people disagree about what
the law requires because they disagree about the moral significance
156
of our legal practices.” This puts the cart before the horse, for
even if law does not generate its own distinctive domain of
normativity, nonmoral disagreements rooted in law’s institutional
nature may best explain—as a conceptual and, perhaps, empirical
matter—the widespread nature of theoretical controversy in legal
practice.
Again following the general contours of Searle’s argument, all
institutional reality depends on a basic level of human cooperation,
not necessarily for good, and possibly secured by coercion, but
rooted in the collective recognition of rights, obligations, duties,
and authority, that give subjects desire-independent reasons for
157
action in the institutional context. This collective recognition is
the glue that permits observer-relative institutional facts to exist. To
sustain the institution, these power relations and commitments
must both be intended, or at least be capable of being interpreted
as intended, and defined with a sufficient level of exactness.
When a legal case begins, or when a legal issue arises, the first
step for the parties or the court is to discern whether the existing
legal materials—prior decisions, enactments, and so forth—point
the way ahead. If the answer is clearly “yes,” law is likely, but
certainly not strictly compelled, to accept that outcome and resolve
the matter. If not clear, the court will summon some manner of
158
persuasive authority. But either way, the controversy that defines
the case will at the outset be characterized by a claim that one
outcome or the other is supported by existing institutional facts
which are directed at the new situation.
Institutional logic, no less when it comes to legal institutions,
demands that the community be capable of recognizing that the
case has been presented, that the empowered official or panel has
155. DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 15, at 405.
156. Hershovitz, supra note 46, at 1195.
157. See SEARLE, FREEDOM AND NEUROBIOLOGY, supra note 66, at 9.
158. See, e.g., Reid, 718 F.2d at 680 (“In deciding a question of first
impression, the decisions of courts of other jurisdictions are persuasive
authority.”).
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resolved the case, and that, as a result, the party or parties involved
must do this or refrain from doing that. Legal officials may
systematically conceal the outcome, perhaps by trucking the subject
away at midnight to an obscure gulag, but, in that case, the
community is capable of recognizing that this sort of “infraction” is
159
tragically handled by means of that sort of exercise of power.
In a legal system, officials and participants intend that the
parties to a proceeding will leave with a sense that they understand
what is next expected of them, or at least that what has occurred is
capable of being construed and explained to them in rational
160
Although this should usually happen, some
discourse.
contingencies will not have been addressed, which may engender
contention for future actors in their later case. Alternatively, the
future actors may view the prior case as settling certain aspects of
the new affair, but not others. The entity charged with
interpretation, typically the court, will usually discern a minimal
content that has previously been determined with sufficient
161
specificity.
Were the parties to a case or controversy to leave the scene
without the sense of a certain level of clarity about the rule or norm
that has resolved the matter, or that will thereafter govern their
interactions, the system would be appropriately criticized as having
failed to function in its communications, and more broadly in
162
fulfilling its institutional role of regulating transactions.
Although depicting law’s institutional constraints as the
workings of its internal morality, Lon Fuller famously articulated

159. See generally Sherwin, supra note 7, at 1793.
160. See WILLISTON, supra note 48, at 127–28 (“[T]he law must be applied by
men engaged in practical affairs and by so many of them that to be useful a legal
doctrine must be capable of being understood and stated by men who are neither
profound scholars nor interested in abstract thought.”); cf. HABERMAS, supra note
48, at 232–33 (“[T]he legitimacy of legal statutes is determined not only by the
rightness of moral judgments but, among other things, by the availability, cogency,
relevance and selection of information; by how fruitful such information proves to
be; by how appropriately the situation is interpreted and the issue framed.”).
161. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee, 269 N.W. at 689; Magluta, 198 F.3d at 1280
(“[A] district court’s error is not ‘plain’ or ‘obvious’ if there is no precedent
directly resolving an issue.”), vacated on other grounds, 203 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir.
2000).
162. See, e.g., In re Williams, 2000 WL 222033, at *2 (“[W]e find the vagueness
doctrine applicable . . . because it applies to legislation that lacks clarity and
precision.”).
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eight criteria that any legal system must aspire towards: (1) the
adoption of general rules that permit the system to avoid merely ad
hoc decision making; (2) the publication of those rules such that
participants may be capable of knowing what is expected of them;
(3) the general prohibition on the abuse of retroactive legislation;
(4) the articulation of the rules such as they may be
understandable; (5) the coherence of the rules such that the duties
they impose are not in conflict with one another; (6) the adoption
of rules that the participants are reasonably capable of obeying; (7)
the maintenance of a fairly stable set of rules, thereby avoiding
frequent and disorienting changes; and (8) a congruence between
the rules adopted and the way in which legal officials enforce and
163
administer those rules.
Fuller introduced his standards by means of a lengthy allegory,
one in which conjured monarch-Rex attempts to create a legal
system for his kingdom in ways that successively violate each of the
164
eight principles. At each step, the legal system, as an institution,
breaks down, because the kingdom’s subjects refuse to collectively
accept the legitimacy of the unworkable scheme. As Fuller then
announced:
A total failure in any one of these eight directions does
not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in
something that is not properly called a legal system at all,
except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a void
165
contract can still be said to be one kind of contract.
Fuller thereby expressed an existential view of law’s minimal
institutional constraints. As the legal philosopher Matthew Kramer
has already pointed out, however, law—and indeed Fuller’s eight
precepts engendering law—is as compatible with an evil legal
166
system as with a good one. A respect for individual cognitive
autonomy presupposed by the eight precepts, for example, as
readily pertains when a bank robber orders his victim to do certain
things, because, in that instance, the robber implicitly
acknowledges his victim’s capacity for rational reflection and
163. See FULLER, supra note 63, at 39.
164. Id. at 33–38.
165. See id. at 39. Fuller’s adjectival use of total is important to note, given his
further acknowledgment that “the inner morality of law is condemned to remain
largely a morality of aspiration and not of duty. Its primary appeal must be to a
sense of trusteeship and to the pride of the craftsman.” Id. at 43.
166. See KRAMER, supra note 4, at 44, 59–60; see also HART, supra note 3, at 211.
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167

decision making. Fuller himself qualifies the significance of his
desiderata by conceding that, “[w]ith respect to the demands of
legality other than promulgation, then, the most we can expect of
constitutions and courts is that they save us from the abyss; they
cannot be expected to lay out very many compulsory steps toward
168
truly significant accomplishment.” Because Fuller’s constraints
implicate the legal system’s ability to survive and persist as an
institution, we can adapt them to our institutional approach
without accepting the inference he draws to an inner morality for
law.
The legal system assigns status functions by promulgating rules
and standards to the officials who assume the duty of formulating,
administering, or implementing the law in specific and more
169
generalized areas. As with any institution charged with a practical
functionality, a legal system would dissipate and be rendered
ineffectual were its assignments of rights, duties, and
responsibilities to be conveyed in a manner requiring so much
interpretation as to render it incapable of guiding the participants’
conduct. Rules or standards imparted solely by parable or riddle,
for instance, to suggest a scenario at the extreme would be so vague
170
and confusing as to be unworkable and impracticable.
For the most part, the meaning of a law, and of the legal duty
it imposes, must be capable of being easily understood by those
charged with the duty. Community members develop an evaluative
attitude and justified expectations that legal officials will adhere to
the status functions assigned to them and legal officials, like
167. KRAMER, supra note 4, at 59.
168. FULLER, supra note 63, at 44. Fuller’s justification for the promulgation
condition somewhat parallels Searle’s claims for the institutional exactness
constraint. Fuller says the requirement that laws be published “does not rest on
any such absurdity as an expectation that the dutiful citizen will sit down and read
them all” but rather on the practical conclusion that those who do know the law
will by their behavior indirectly influence the others similarly to observe the law.
Id. Although Fuller also includes moral language, such that each citizen is “at least
entitled to know” the law, even if not individually studying it, he lays out an
institutional dynamic by which power is assigned and maintained. Id. at 51.
169. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 85, at 181 (“[C]ompetition between federal and
non-federal officials for implementation authority helps insure that federal laws
are implemented by officials who are both faithful to the purposes of such laws yet
independent from Congress.”).
170. Cf. Note, supra note 85, at 407 (arguing that certain “standards laid down
by the [Supreme] Court are so vague that they do not offer a workable basis for
distinguishing” requirements of the Securities Act of 1933).
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officials in other institutions, commit themselves in a public way to
171
satisfy those expectations. There are no doubt exceptions, such as
when a legislature enacts an abhorrent law, or even when private
contractual parties execute an unconscionable agreement, known
172
to offend judicial sensibilities. But in such cases expectations of
judicial enforcement may not be justified.
Although Fuller’s eight conditions do not necessitate an
internal morality for law, they are compelling indicia of the
intentionality and exactness constraints that maintain law’s
institutional power structures and relations. More to the point,
these conditions help locate some of the focal points that may
engender nonmoral theoretical disagreement over the standards
governing those institutional constraints. Participants disagree over
whether a ruling may have been general enough to cover their
circumstance, whether a rule as published clearly enough supports
a litigant’s construction, and so forth. Disputes over the standards
governing
such
guideposts,
e.g.,
generality,
clarity,
understandability, coherence, and capability of being obeyed, are
not in the first instance moral ones, and, indeed, legal officials will
often have little patience for a detour into moral argumentation
173
about them.
Less anecdotally, while non-positivists may deny that Nazi
174
edicts were law, it is not apparent that they would deny the Nazi
apparatus to have been an institution. For a regime committed to
evil, dispute over institutional constraints qualifying as theoretical
would persist by virtue of the system’s institutional structures and
needs, but could hardly be seen as inevitably grounded in the
furtherance of best moral outcomes. If such theoretical dispute
over institutional constraints is more easily accepted as a matter of
social fact but not morality, this only goes to show that theoretical
dispute in law qua institution similarly need not be seen as rooted
in moral controversy.

171. See SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 88.
172. See Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BUFFALO L. REV. 185, 186–87 (2004).
173. E.g., Southard v. Morris, 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 465 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1913)
(“Returning from the digression of moralism, the point urged by counsel for
plaintiff is that the precedents all support the view that the question should have
been submitted to the jury and counsel have produced landmark decisions in
support of his claim.”).
174. DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 15, at 411–12.

7 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

3/24/2016 7:56 PM

NONMORAL THEORETICAL DISAGREEMENT IN LAW

257

As shown with regard to institutions generally, law’s
continuous functioning and maintenance depends on more than
collective recognition of the duties and obligations imposed by
rules, standards, and other devices for assigning status functions
within the legal institution. People upon whom a duty has been
imposed, or to whom a power has been conferred, will be unable to
fulfill that duty or exercise that power unless the community
around them engages in some minimal level of cooperation
chaperoned by a collective intentionality (most significantly the
group’s collective beliefs and ordinary intentions), which accepts
175
the legal rules and principles as reasons for conduct. The citizen
will apply for a passport before trying to travel abroad, engage in a
certain ritual when making a will, stop at the red light, refrain from
fixing prices, and so on. The student may become a lawyer, who
may become a judge, at each stage holding a distinctive status and a
set of obligations arising by virtue of that status.
The prescriptions followed in these instances will tend toward
being sufficiently exact to be capable of being understood, even if
sometimes on the basis of the retained expertise of others more
qualified. But what also must be understood is the fact itself of
collective acceptance. It would not be enough for Ms. Jones to
follow a rule believing it to be meant only for her. She should
understand that others similarly situated are not adhering to
divergent rules or generally following practices that may be at crosspurposes with her own, but are engaged in the same overall
176
enterprise.
This is not to say that the rules and standards in a legal system
must serve the ends of equality or fairness. Laws may be sufficiently
clear and exact to guide community members in achieving
oppressive inequality or unfair domination and deprivation, and
177
these may be a legal system’s intentional objectives. But even
under this scenario, the precision of the power relations specified
by the rules permits subjects to know and obey the laws, which are

175. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 58.
176. See generally Raz, Introduction, supra note 121, at 10 (“I should recognize
that other people are in my position and that if we all adopt a coordinating
practice to follow the directives of a certain body within certain limits then we will
all be able to establish and preserve justified coordinative practices which would
otherwise evade our grasp.”).
177. See Hart, supra note 14, at 616 (calling the Nazi legal system “a Hell
created on earth for men by other men”).
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in turn capable of standing as desire-independent reasons for
178
action.
Nor should the idea of a fairly equal assignment of rights and
imposition of duties across the community rule out non-general,
particularized expressions of law. In other words, an important
aspect of the legal system is its flexibility in addressing localized or
179
particular matters.
A town’s zoning board, for instance, is
charged with weighing several factors in deciding whether to grant
180
Philippe Ifrah a variance to subdivide her property. What is
assumed by the larger community, however, is that each citizen—or
at least each similarly situated (and similarly empowered) citizen—
would receive fairly equal treatment, the same factors being
balanced, were they to apply for such a variance.
It should be noted that George Fletcher has offered an
interesting objection to the notion that the constitutive rules by
which law assigns status functions “must find support in the
attitudes of those for whom the institutional fact resonates as
181
true.” Fletcher, who has therein offered one of the few responses
thus far to Searle’s institutional philosophy as it may pertain to law,
responds that it is validity, rather than social acceptance, which
182
functions as the chief criterion of a law’s “having force.” Laws are
deemed binding, in other words, not necessarily because they are
widely accepted by the society, but rather because they have been
validly enacted. As an example, Fletcher refers to the case of gay
and lesbian marriages, which might hypothetically be recognized as
“legal” by various legislatures, but which may at the same time not
183
be “accepted” by society except in a narrow “technical” sense.
Being the prime mover behind a fairly original area of
philosophical thought, Searle himself has acknowledged that his
184
theory of institutions is nascent and will need to be ironed out.
Even so, it appears that the present theory is powerful enough to
afford significant insight into controversy over the concept of legal

178. See SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 70;
SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 127–31.
179. See generally RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 81, at 216.
180. Ifrah v. Utschig, 774 N.E.2d 732, 733–34 (N.Y. 2002).
181. Fletcher, supra note 84, at 98.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 99.
184. Searle, What Is an Institution?, supra note 43, at 10.
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validity, based on the idea that the assignment of status functions
requires collective recognition and acceptance to work.
First, Searle points out that “acceptance” need not imply
approval, but rather, may occur along a continuum beginning with
185
a very weak grudging acknowledgment of the assignment. In
other words, the sort of collective recognition and acceptance
discussed throughout this article should not be construed to imply
endorsement. The level of acceptance of non-heterosexual
marriage that Fletcher labels “technical” should, at the least, rise to
the level of acknowledgment, however grudging, that such
marriages have been deemed “legal” in the relevant jurisdictions,
that such marriages are thenceforth “entitled,” at least within the
existing legal system to the same legal benefits as heterosexual
ones, and that the political and legislative mechanisms, themselves
accepted by the society, have acted validly.
Second, and rooted in the logic of institutional power
structures, the legal validity of the legislation provides community
members with “desire-independent” reasons for action, namely, a
recognition of the marriages and their now legal trappings. These
desire-independent reasons function precisely because they may
run counter to, or serve to exclude, what the participants may
186
believe to be right or may desire for themselves. They will
understand that the declaration of certain words in a certain
context, on the part of a same-sex couple, now counts as assigning
to that couple the status of being married. Although the odd baker
may refuse to take a wedding cake order from a gay couple, or the
187
odd county clerk to stamp marriage licenses, even they may
grudgingly acknowledge their legal obligation to do so absent a

185. Id. at 10; SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 8.
186. SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 70; SEARLE,
MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 127–31; cf. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS
AND NORMS, supra note 62, at 183 (“An exclusionary reason merely requires us to
avoid something which other reasons make legitimate, but do not require.”).
187. Michael Paulsen & Fernanda Santos, Religious Right in Arizona Cheers Bill
Allowing Businesses to Refuse to Serve Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/us/religious-right-in-arizona-cheers-billallowing-businesses-to-refuse-to-serve-gays.html; Sarah Kaplan & James Higdon, The
Defiant Kim Davis, the Ky. Clerk Who Refuses to Issue Gay Marriage Licenses, WASH. POST
(Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015
/09/02/meet-kim-davis-the-ky-clerk-who-defying-the-supreme-court-refuses-toissue-gay-marriage-licenses/.
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further exemption granted—at least in the interim until subjected
188
to constitutional review—by their legislature.
V. LAW’S WIDESPREAD “THEORETICAL” DISPUTES ARE NONMORAL
CONTROVERSIES ABOUT EXACTNESS AND COLLECTIVE
INTENTIONALITY
We might initially protest that, although by any definition the
legal system certainly qualifies as an institution or set of institutions,
it hardly seems clear that there is much exactness or expression of
“collective” beliefs and intentions involved in legislation and
189
judicial decision-making. How will it make sense, therefore, to
apply the exactness and intentionality constraints to an analysis of
law? And if these constraints are included in the analysis, how will
we not end up diluting our concept of law of its peculiar
institutional character?
We would, for instance, call the well-worn rule vehicles are
prohibited in the park a “law” when adopted by the appropriate lawmaking body. But this does not mean that the rule manifests
official intentions and beliefs to sufficiently convey legal duties and
obligations in a particular case. The rule is exact in a sense, but
fairly imprecise when one considers bicycles, roller skates, or
190
ambulances responding to an emergency.
Somewhat paradoxically, however, the inherent inexactness of
language—and therefore of declarations, rules and laws—should
actually support, far more than it may tend to refute, a Searlean
institutional explanation of legal phenomena central to the long
debate over law’s nature. Specifically, the institutional pull within
188. Paulsen & Santos, supra note 187 (“Most states where same-sex marriage
is legal have exemptions for religious organizations, but not for private businesses
or individuals.”).
189. See generally Howard, supra note 7, at 390 (emphasizing that language and
hence legal documents are inexact and indeterminate, and require extensive
interpretation); Chris Williams, The Search for Bases of Decision in Commercial Law:
Llewellyn Redux, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1495, 1495 (1984) (book review) (noting the
legal realists’ view that “language and rules are inherently imprecise and
manipulable . . . and that formal or mechanistic approaches to the law mask the
far more complex relationships between law and the rest of life”).
190. HART, supra note 3, at 607; see, e.g., State ex rel. Miller v. Claiborne, 505
P.2d 732, 735 (Kan. 1973) (addressing whether chickens are animals for purposes
of statute forbidding cruelty to animals); White City Shopping Ctr., LP v. PR Rest.,
LLC, No. 2006196313, 2006 WL 3292641, at *1 (Mass. Oct. 31, 2006) (deciding
whether the term “sandwiches” includes burritos, tacos and quesadillas).
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law toward compliance with the intentionality and exactness
constraints provides an interesting explanation of the
argumentative structure of legal practice. Moreover, this reason
may be more accessible, and ultimately more fitting, than
Dworkin’s because it need not rely upon a structure “hidden”
191
beneath the surface of legal decision making. Rather, the will to
comply with institutional constraints upon the creation and
exercise of deontic power should be fairly well apparent on the
surface of judicial decisions.
Dworkin viewed controversy in law as rooted in dispute over
moral content, with judges seeking to determine which legal—or
moral hence legal—principle best fits the conflict at hand and
192
justifies the new outcome. Constructive interpretation rejects the
idea of an “existing law” in which there will be a distinct collection of
193
legal rules, principles, and other standards. In a Dworkinian
world, the right answer to legal cases should follow from our best
interpretation of the data at hand, applying a principled
consistency over time, using the soundest principles and standards
194
of theory construction drawn from society’s political morality.
This is, for Dworkin, the hidden structure of legal
argumentation, which engenders widespread theoretical
disagreement in pursuit not only of justice and fairness, but
195
integrity. A precedent carries a “gravitational force” that “escapes
196
the language of its opinion.”
It is at Dworkin’s second,
“interpretive” stage, in the process of justifying the practice and
placing law’s existing materials in their best light, and then also at
the fairly marginal third, “post-interpretive” or “reforming” stage of
the constructive interpretive exercise—at which interpreters finetune their sense of what the legal practice “really” requires so as to
191. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 265.
192. Id. at 7–8, 225, 285 (setting out his view that lawyers and judges “are
really disagreeing about . . . issues of morality and fidelity,” and that such
controversy is rooted in “principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due
process” based on “some general scheme of moral responsibility”); Ronald
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1084, 1096 (1975).
193. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 7, at 343–44 (“I do want
to reject . . . the picture of ‘existing law’ . . . . There is no such thing as ‘the law’ as
a collection of discrete propositions, each with its own canonical form.”).
194. Cf. Soper, supra note 1, at 1741–42 (discussing Dworkin’s theory as just
stated).
195. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 166.
196. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 7, at 112–13.
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best serve the moral justification located at the second stage—that
consensus becomes far less likely and theoretical disagreement may
197
abound.
The theory of adjudication that views the “gravitational”—and
deontic—force of institutionally binding determinations as
“escaping” or being “hidden” from the language of those decisions
appears to stand in quite some contrast to Searle’s view of the logic
of institutions. Recall that, for Searle, constitutive rules that
construct the institution consist in speech acts known as “standing
198
[d]eclarations.”
It is by virtue of those declarations that
institutions permit the individuals, entities, or objects involved to
“count as” having a certain significance and status within the
institution. At the same time, regulative rules that govern behavior
within the institution are known, in linguistic terms, as “standing
199
[d]irectives.”
This is not to say that institutional rules do not have
“gravitational force” that transcends the language used to frame
them or that they do not require constant interpretation. The
point, however, is that the linguistic expression is primary. When
an institution assigns power, it intends to communicate, and
thereby needs to be fairly clear and precise lest the assignment be
futile and incapable of collective recognition. Determining what
sort of deontic power the declaration assigns is conceptually prior
to an interpretation that may “escape” the language.
Like other speakers, courts and legislatures rely on linguistic
conventions to convey meaning in an efficient and repeatable
200
manner. In the institutional setting, the question is what power
the declaration or declaring entity intends and believes itself to
assign—whether a positive power, such as a right, or a negative
power, such as a duty or obligation—and with what level of
exactness that assignment has been made. Language functions in

197. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 66–67, 230–31 (setting out his
theory of the three stages by which law is constructively interpreted).
198. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 97.
199. Id. (explaining that a regulative rule, such as “Drive on the right hand
side of the road,” functions as a standing directive aimed at conditioning the
behavior of drivers); see supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text (providing
examples showing the distinction between standing directives and standing
declarations).
200. See SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 73–74.
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the institutional setting to constitute, as well as describe, the
201
obligation, right, or duty intended to be assigned.
When citizens want to learn what legal right or duty they may
have in a situation, they look to the statutory and regulatory
materials, writings, sanctions, or permissions that the law will
enforce, as well as any legal decisions that bear on the issue. Legal
officials do the same when trying to figure out how to treat a case.
By looking for authorities that bear on the issue, these participants
seek out the data most exactly to the point. If the authority appears
close enough to be decisive, the work in most cases is done. As
Justice Roger Traynor put it:
[A] judge invariably takes precedent as his starting point;
he is constrained to arrive at a decision in the context of
ancestral judicial experience: the given decisions or,
lacking these, the given clues. Even if his search of the
past yields nothing, so that he confronts a truly
unprecedented case, he still arrives at a decision in the
context of judicial reasoning with recognizable ties to the
past; by its kinship thereto it not only establishes the
unprecedented case as a precedent for the future, but
integrates it into the often rewoven but always unbroken
line with the past. A judge is constrained not only to heed
the relevant judicial past in arriving at a decision, but also
to arrive at it within as straight and narrow a path as
202
possible.
There should be an intuitive consensus about Trainor’s view of
the judge’s duty. Few would disagree that the court’s deliberation,
even when not bound by a controlling precedent, is constrained by
203
The path, as straight and narrow as possible,
standards.
“establishes the unprecedented case as a precedent for the
204
future;” but the question remains whether this is accomplished
owing to the moral content of law’s embedded standards and
principles, or by way of judicial discretion which creates the new
precedent as an expression of the court’s evolving practical
philosophy about what the law, and self-referentially the institution,
should be.
201. SEARLE, FREEDOM AND NEUROBIOLOGY, supra note 66, at 93.
202. Traynor, supra note 104, at 774–75.
203. See Raz, supra note 106, at 115 (setting forth normative theses concerning
the types of argument required to justify claims that authority is legitimate and the
factors that should guide the exercise of practical authority).
204. Traynor, supra note 104, at 775.
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Dworkin said that the argumentative structure of legal
practice, which involves theoretical disagreement “about the
soundest interpretation of some pertinent aspect of judicial
205
practice,” counts in favor of the non-positivist construction that
asserts law’s moral ground. This article presupposes theoretical
disagreement, but contends that the conceptually prior
disagreement that happens in a theoretical and widespread way is a
dispute over standards of exactness and intentionality. The
controversy is thereby, in the first instance, over the social fact of
whether, gauged by those standards, the given law and decisions
yield the outcome.
The non-positivist claim has always presupposed that
theoretical disagreement in law rests on personal and political
206
morality, and “usually raises moral issues.”
For Dworkin,
theoretical disagreement wrestles over the correct way to interpret
the data or practice before the court, an exercise grounded on the
moral quest to make legal practice the best social practice it can
207
be. Even in Dworkinian terms, however, theoretical disagreement
is not necessarily grounded in morality. For this, unadorned, is a
controversy “about the grounds of law, about which other kinds of
propositions, when true, make a particular proposition of law
208
true.” Paraphrasing, the parties to a dispute will be engaged in a
Dworkinian theoretical disagreement when they disagree about
what must occur in the legal system before a proposition of law can
209
be said to be true.
And even for Dworkin, an interpretation may justify because it
fits, and therefore “the distinction between the two dimensions is
210
less crucial or profound than it might seem.” The question of fit
211
alone should be an area of substantial disagreement. At one
extreme, dissents in legal decisions sometimes charge that the
majority has ignored a controlling precedent and the majority may

205. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 87.
206. BESSON, supra note 61, at 23; Shapiro, supra note 6, at 44.
207. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 1, at 293.
208. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 5.
209. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 1, at 285.
210. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 231.
211. See Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE
L.J. 1561, 1571 (1994) (“[E]ven the threshold question of whether the statute was
ambiguous presented a hard case.”) (citing LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF
JUDGES 70–71 (1993)).
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212

say the same about the dissenting view.
In the usual and
ubiquitous practice, though, the debate is whether or to what
extent the precedents cited by the adversary are distinguishable
213
from the case before the court. Doctrines are also parsed and
214
Before the new dispute arises, existing legal
distinguished.
sources—whether they be as general as a statute or judicial holding,
or as individualized as a zoning variance or contract—define the
status functions that constitute legal relations and regulate society.
The non-positivist view has taken theoretical disagreement to
be fairly lofty, involving dispute that goes to the core of political
morality. If, however, legal controversy comes down to the
widespread jockeying over standards of exactness and
intentionality, including issues such as ambiguity and
distinguishability, then theoretical disagreement is rather
quotidian. But that is quite the point: theoretical disagreement is
recurrent, hence quotidian. Yet positivists have acquiesced in the
grander view and have thereby engaged in responding to the
215
“powerful” challenge.
Hart came to believe that “soft” or inclusive positivism, by
which the identification of law may sometimes depend upon moral
criteria and the “open texture” of language which renders law
incomplete in hard cases, are the vehicles by which to answer
216
The
Dworkin’s claim of theoretical disagreement in law.
problem, however, is to account for theoretical disagreement that
not only occurs in law, but that is widespread. Hart was
conceptually deterred from acknowledging any such widespread
controversy owing to his theoretical commitment to law’s certaintyproviding function. While not “paramount and overriding,” the
212. See Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Grp. Long Term Disability Ins.
Program, 189 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 1999) (saying that, although the dissent
“claims that we . . . ignore controlling precedent . . . , we feel that our precedents
require our decision today”).
213. See United States v. Clark, 163 F.App’x. 799, 801 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Clark
gives us no sound reason for his position, and he is not able to distinguish
precedent that is closely on point, the logic of which applies to this issue.”);
Carson v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 80 S.E. 1080, 1081 (N.C. 1914) (noting that prior case
was “so closely analogous as not to be distinguishable”).
214. E.g., Arnold v. All Am. Assurance Co., 499 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Ark. 1973)
(“In the law of agency the concept of ratification is closely related to the doctrine
of estoppel, even though the two may be distinguished.”).
215. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 35.
216. HART, supra note 3, at 251–52.
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certainty-providing function of the rule of recognition
presupposed, for Hart, some limit on the degree of uncertainty that
217
a society could tolerate.
What should be considered, however, is the disconnect
between legal philosophy—wherein the philosopher wrangles over
218
the concept of legal validity—and the practice it interprets.
Ubiquitous tension in litigated cases over standards of exactness
and intentionality explains the appearance of widespread
theoretical disagreement from a nonmoral perspective. The legal
norms set out in the prior case may or may not apply in the present
one, with its dissimilar (in varying degrees) factual context. This
uncertainty has been taken to result from an inherent vagueness in
the language used and now needing to be “precisified [sic]” for
219
application in the new context.
In other respects, however, it is widespread stability and the
lack of biting controversy rooted in political morality that
characterizes legal systems. Were the implications of a substantial
portion of institutional norms to be indeterminate, then the
institution’s status would itself be fledgling or doubtful—an
220
arrangement striving to be a legal system. The view, however, that
law’s argumentative structure engenders nonmoral disagreement—
arising from controversy over the standards governing the
intentionality and exactness constraints—should align with Hart’s
insight that, while the existence of law is relatively certain, law’s
221
application in particular cases may be significantly controversial.
The present view may also benefit the Dworkinian approach to
some extent, by tamping down if not resolving an irksome paradox.
In Dworkin’s interpretive model, legal principles are identified in
the exercise in which they are set forth to justify the legal
222
practice. Yet, the interpretive exercise seeking principles that fit
the prior practice is epistemically prior. Principles must both fit
and justify the legal practice at the second stage, and then, at the
third, be fine-tuned based on the interpreter’s best substantive
convictions about the practice and the principles identified at the

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 252.
See MARMOR, supra note 83, at 4.
SOAMES, supra note 72, at 289; HART, supra note 3, at 128.
KRAMER, supra note 4, at 142–44.
HART, supra note 3, at 160.
See supra text accompanying note 131.
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223

second stage.
In the Dworkinian scheme we are more
knowledgeable, and there is less controversy, about principles
identified as fitting the practice and then we are left to ask more
controversially whether the principles justify the practice. If,
however, legal principles can only be demarcated at the latter stage
involving justification, how can these be known to us at the
epistemically prior interpretive stage gauging fit?
Rooting much of legal controversy in disagreement over
standards of exactness and intentionality relocates the ground of
theoretical disagreement to the interpretive exercise in which
principles are measured for fit. This case must be decided and its
degree of difference from the prior case becomes the focus of
dispute. Each participant—whether an official or a litigant—asks
whether the existing legal data, with its embedded norms, support
224
her own interpretation with sufficient intention and specificity.
Remaining open to the inevitable claim that existing legal materials
are “distinguishable,” the court implicitly acknowledges that its
decision making may cover greater terrain than provided by the
given materials.
Engaging in this exercise by deciding which rights and duties
have been intended or sufficiently specified, or alternatively which
the law should assign, judges reflectively engage in the development
of their practical philosophy concerning the court’s institutional
role. Developing their practical philosophy, judges do not passively
receive societal norms but actively participate in norm
225
elaboration. Portions of prior decisions not necessary to the
holding, and thereby not contained within the holding’s
226
intentional contents, are dismissed as “obiter dicta,” and dicta
227
becomes law if later adopted.

223. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 228.
224. E.g., Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp., 699 N.E.2d 376, 378–79 (N.Y. 1998)
(disagreeing over whether, by the language and purpose of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, and its legislative history, Congress intended to
preempt state common law claims for injuries arising from the lack of a driver’sside air bag).
225. See Diver, supra note 123, at 1441 (discussing suggestions by Christopher
F. Edley, Jr., “on how a reviewing court would go about elaborating norms of
sound governance and how the judiciary could be better equipped, by training
and expert assistance, for the demands of such a challenging assignment”).
226. See Shearin v. Wayne Davis & Co., P.C., 637 S.E.2d 679, 681 (Ga. 2006).
227. E.g., State v. Fahringer, 666 P.2d 514, 515 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
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The legal system necessarily wields power, but fulfillment of
the epistemic exactness constraint is requisite to the attribution of
power. When the legal system adopts the rule vehicles prohibited in
the park, one side may argue that the exactness constraint has not
been satisfied when it comes to a certain thing. The claim that law’s
power has not reached the use of that thing is, in effect, a claim
that the thing does not exist within the rule’s collective intentional
content. Not, that is, until sufficiently precise social facts exist by
which citizens may be able to delimit vehicle in the desired way.
228
Secondary rules, and in particular “rules of change,” give the
procedure for changing the law. A statute of wills, for instance, might
be seen as a rule of change from the statutory default distribution
229
of property should a person die intestate. Nearly by definition
then, the content of the testator’s choice of whom to favor in his will
results from extralegal considerations, whether this is persuasive
authority or, more likely, the nonlinguistic influence of personal
affections.
Persuasive authority runs the gamut, from the opinions of co230
equal courts to legislative histories to legal treatises to Aristotle. A
great source of the compelling nature of Dworkin’s view is that,
indeed, courts will hold out their reliance upon persuasive
authority to be a legal, as opposed to extralegal, exercise. In the
231
classic case of Sherwood v. Walker, for instance, Hiram Walker
agreed to sell his cow, Rose 2d of Aberlone, to the banker, T. C.
232
Sherwood, both parties falsely believing Rose was barren. Said the
court:
This question as to the passing of title is fraught with
difficulties, and not always easy of solution. An
examination of the multitude of cases bearing upon this
subject, with their infinite variety of facts, and at least
apparent conflict of law, ofttimes [sic] tends to confuse
rather than to enlighten the mind of the inquirer. It is
best, therefore, to consider always, in cases of this kind,
228. HART, supra note 3, at 95–96 (explaining that the most basic “rules of
change” authorize officials to alter or adopt new primary rules of conduct for the
ordinary citizen subject to those primary rules).
229. See Jeremy Waldron, Who Needs Rules of Recognition, in THE RULE OF
RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 327, 330–31 (Matthew D. Adler &
Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009).
230. Flanders, supra note 98, at 63–64.
231. 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887).
232. Id. at 920.
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the general principles of the law, and then apply them as
233
best we may to the facts of the case in hand.
However, the Sherwood court then disregarded existing legal
principles as applied to horses and opted for a new legal rule
234
channeling Aristotle’s Categories. The dissenting opinion agreed
with the Aristotelian language, but insisted that prior authority
235
“clearly sustains the views I have taken.” This was a controversy
over the standards inhering in the legal system’s institutional
exactness and intentionality constraints.
The primary controversy in Sherwood was whether law about
horse trading was sufficiently “directed at” cow bargaining. It was
also about whether prior law concerning a mutual mistake over the
soundness of a horse was sufficiently directed at larger situations
reaching mutual mistakes over bovine fertility. These issues suggest
236
disagreement rooted in the intentionality constraint.
The
controversy might also be seen as stemming from disagreement
over whether the existing law covered the present situation with
sufficient exactness. The practitioner’s first question in Sherwood
was whether there had been a sufficiently precise assignment of
Walker’s right to rescind, Sherwood’s obligation to replevy, or his
237
entitlement to walk away with unexpected profit in hand.
Exactness and intentionality disputes reveal the conceptually
prior layer of controversy, and account for the argumentative
structure of legal practice. The controversy arises when one side
claims that a precedent covers the new kind of circumstance, while
the other side deems the new situation to be of an unprecedented
kind; this disagreement typically boils down to competing litigation
stances in which one side defines the kind broadly enough to
233. Id. at 921.
234. Id. at 923 (fashioning a rule using the terms “substance,” “quality,” and
“accident” derived from Aristotle’s Categories 3b10). See Aristotle, Categories 3b10, in 1
THE COMPLETE WORDS OF ARISTOTLE 3, 6 (Jonathan Barnes ed., Oxford trans.,
1984) (1956).
235. Sherwood, 33 N.W. at 926 (Sherwood, J., dissenting).
236. See MARMOR, supra note 83, at 129–31 (showing that there may well be
secondary disputes regarding intentionality, including over the method for
determining judicial and legislative intention in the ordinary sense); cf. Marc L.
Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 187 n.179 (2008)
(indicating that this level of disagreement should be minimized with regard to
judicial decisions, which by their nature tend to supply reasoning and thereby, or
at least, claim to be somewhat transparent).
237. Sherwood, 33 N.W. at 921.
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support its expansive view, while the opposing side defines the kind
238
The nonso narrowly as to exclude it from consideration.
positivist approach has been too eager to move from the realm of
fit into the conceptually richer domain of justification.
Nevertheless, Dworkin, for example, held out the search for a
239
morally best outcome in the case of Riggs v. Palmer,
as
240
characteristic of legal practice. Even in Riggs, in which Elmer had
murdered his grandfather in order to gain his inheritance, the
outcome-determinative disagreement did not center on the moral
issue. The entire appellate panel agreed that morality would
241
frustrate Elmer’s scheme. The judges disputed whether the case
should be decided in accord with the morally required outcome.
They struggled to delimit their theoretical disagreement to the
standard by which to weigh the presumed collective intention of
the legislators against the precision of their statutory language
regulating the making of testamentary documents.
Even for the limited range of cases arising from the unsettled
construction of constitutional or statutory clauses, and in which
different interpretive methodologies are available, the issue of
whether prior legal assertions and stipulations are sufficiently
directed to the question typically takes priority over, and often
preempts, any theoretical debate concerning interpretive
242
approaches. Owing to its institutional logic, the legal system
238. See QUINE, supra note 17, at 5 (explaining that our definition of concepts
and our understanding of dispositions may vary depending upon how narrowly or
broadly we define the sort the thing, the “kind,” at issue).
239. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
240. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 15–20.
241. Compare Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190 (wherein the majority opinion asks,
“[u]nder such circumstances, what law, human or divine, will allow him to take the
estate and enjoy the fruits of his crime?”), with Riggs, 22 N.E. at 191 (Grey, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing that, “if I believed that the decision of the question could be
effected by considerations of an equitable nature, I should not hesitate to assent to
views which commend themselves to the conscience”).
242. See Lan-Dale Co. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 431, 435 (2009) (“While the
Court would have been quite comfortable following [a different] position . . . that
option is not available. The Court has no choice but to follow the precedent . . . ,
but it does so grudgingly, hoping that 28 U.S.C. § 1500 might be restored to its
original intent in the near future.”); Phillips v. City of Oakland, No. C 07-3885 CW,
2008 WL 1901005, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2008) (declining to decide with
plaintiff, stating “[p]laintiff . . . urges the Court to apply an interpretation of the
Commerce Clause based on the original intent of the framers of the Constitution.
Even if the Court were inclined to adopt such an interpretation, however, it is not
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ascribes a higher status to prior status function assignments, as
evidenced by the existing legal materials, than to theoretical debate
not arising from institutional exactness and intentionality
243
constraints.
A constructive interpreter may ask which outcome is morally
best but, apart from questions of competence, this is not the
practitioner’s priority. The existing law, as communicated in the
legal materials, might have successfully assigned rights and
obligations, such that the parties and legal officials are able
collectively to recognize the content of this assignment of positive
244
and negative powers. The idea of this sort of success is a loose
one, and a matter of degree, hinging on whether the current
matter is resolved because the current participants consider
themselves to be grasping, and covered by, the intentions expressed
in the earlier determination. If so, the parties and officials are
under the sway of desire-independent institutional reasons to act. If
not, or occasionally because it seems time for a change, they turn to
the complex network of persuasive authority derived from moral
reasoning and other sources.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent social and institutional philosophy affords us new
analytic tools for assessing the logic and dynamics of institutions.
Applying this new thinking to legal philosophy sheds further light
on how we can move the latter project beyond the well-rehearsed
parameters of the Hart-Dworkin debate. Efforts to do so in the past
few years have been compelling, but are subject to challenge. This
free to disregard established precedent”); Lowery v. Haithcock, 79 S.E.2d 204,
208–09 (N.C. 1953) (“Our former decisions have liberalized the lien statute upon
which plaintiff relies—perhaps beyond the original intent. Even so, we must apply
the statute as heretofore construed by this Court.”).
243. Although case precedents afford a legal system a mobile and efficient
means of assigning status functions and of adjusting prior assignments and
functions, this article is ultimately neutral with regard to a theory of judicial
precedent. Its thesis is consistent with the idea that there may be a legal system in
which officials are assigned status functions obligating them to disregard or
devalue prior case decisions, and thereby not to treat those individual decisions as
carrying status-function-assignment functions. See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, Linking
Support and Inheritance: A New Model from China, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1199, 1206
(“China does not publish U.S.-style case reporters or even formally recognize
judicial precedent.”).
244. See MARMOR, supra note 83, at 21–22.
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is not to say that the recent work on institutions and social ontology
has necessarily been well applied here, or the current
developments in legal philosophy well challenged. But perhaps this
article has suggested a new approach for reconciling the
appearance of widespread theoretical disagreement in law with its
reality.

